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Abstract
In this paper, we propose a new mechanism able to explain the
occurrence of credit crunches. Considering a credit market with an
asymmetry of information between borrowers and lenders, we assume
that borrowers have to pay a cost to reveal information on the qual-
ity of their project. They decide to be transparent if it is necessary
for getting a loan or for paying a lower interest rate. Two types of
competitive equilibria may exist: an opaque equilibrium in which all
projects receive funding without revealing information; a transparent
one in which only the best projects reval information and receive fund-
ing. It is also possible to get multiple equilibria. Incorporating this
microeconomic mechanism in an OLG model, the economy may ex-
perience uctuations due to the change of regime, and indeterminacy
may occur.
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1 Introduction
With the global nancial crisis of 2007-2008, originally driven by mortgage-
backed securities, the world economy has experienced a strong nancial insta-
bility. The pre-crisis period was a time of easy credit conditions, low interest
rates, and decline in lending standards. The di¤usion of structured invest-
ment vehicles, the extension of securitization, the development of shadow
system banking have increased opacity into the nancial markets. The crisis
produced a credit crunch related to a crisis of condence in all the borrow-
ers. The nancial crisis was transmitted to the real economy and the credit
crunch led to a contraction of the economic activity: asset prices dropped,
unemployment increased, and output growth bogged down.
This paper proposes a theory that may explain a sudden credit crunch,
associated with the transition from a high income equilibrium to a low income
equilibrium. As many previous works, this theory is based on information
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, borrowers having an information
advantage on their project. But it departs from these works in assuming that
information revelation induces a cost that is borne by the borrower. If the
relevance of this assumption has been recognized by di¤erent authors (see
Tirole 2006 for a general survey), its consequences have not been subject to
a general analysis. More precisely, we assume that a borrower can choose
to be "opaque" or "transparent", and that he must incur a cost to reveal
the quality of his project. This cost can be explained by the existence of a
direct cost of information revelation: auditing and advertising. It can also
be justied by indirect costs, mainly the fact that being transparent implies
to quit o¤shore activities, and to support higher taxes.
In taking into account costly information revelation, we build a signaling
model of credit markets. A borrower chooses to be transparent either if
it is necessary to get a loan, or if he can get a lower interest payment and
earn a higher prot. Moreover, as being transparent reveals the quality of the
project to the lenders, only good projects have an incentive to be transparent
as bad ones would pay a cost without being nanced.
We rst consider a simple partial equilibrium model, with the assumption
of an exogenous safe interest R0 at which banks can be renanced. We show
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that two threshold levels R^ and R plays a role in the equilibrium, with
R^ < R. For a low safe interest (R0 < R^), banks are willing to o¤er loans
at low rates. All projects can be nanced and no borrowers have incentive
to reveal information. This leads to an opaque equilibrium of high activity
where all projects obtain a loan. When the safe interest is high (R0 > R),
banks ask for high repayments. At equilibrium, only the good projects reveal
information and are nanced. Projects of low quality cannot be nanced.
This leads to a transparent equilibrium with low activity. Finally, when
the safe interest is middle-valued (R^ < R0 < R), both types of equilibria
exist together. In this case, there exists some interdependence between good
and bad projects. If good projects remain opaque, the average gain on all
projects allows nancing a return for the bank higher than R0: Consequently,
bad projects can be nanced. If good projects are transparent, the remaining
opaque projects o¤er an average gain that is too low to be nanced.
A simple extension of the static model is obtained in assuming the ex-
istence of a supply curve for savings that is increasing in R0: With this
assumption, the safe interest rate is endogenously determined. Two types
of equilibria may exist, opaque or transparent. It is also possible to obtain
multiple equilibria in the interval

R^; R

. In this interval, the economy may
experience a jump from an opaque to a transparent equilibrium that leads to
a credit crunch. The credit crunch generates a sudden fall in loans accom-
panied by transparency requirements. It also leads to a fall in production.
Finally, the static model is incorporated in an overlapping generations
model that allows to endogenize the savings function and to study the dy-
namics of output. At each period, the economy can be in an opaque or
transparent equilibrium. The equilibrium regime of period t determines the
amount of output then the quantity of savings available to nance future
projects. The demand for loans also depends on the type of equilibrium that
will occur in t + 1; opaque or transparent. So the economy may experience
transitions between the di¤erent regimes.
The dynamics is studied with respect to the interest factor Rt; which is a
predetermined variable as it is determined by the credit market in t 1. The
intertemporal equilibrium can lead to di¤erent types of dynamics and some
numerical examples are provided. Depending on the value of the parameters,
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the dynamics can be determinate or not. In the case of determinacy, for any
value of Rt there exists only one value for Rt 1:
Even in the case of determinacy, the economy may experience endogenous
uctuations corresponding to a change of regime between opaque and trans-
parent equilibria. We also present examples of indeterminacy for which the
two regimes may be possible at a given period. The coordination of agents on
one regime would need some selection mechanism such as some self-fullling
prophecy.
Our model is based on previous works. First the static model can be
viewed as an extension of Drees Eckwert and Vardy (2013), who consider a
model with investors that can choose between more or less opaque projects.
They show that investors favor more transparent projects when the interest
rate is higher. Our static model is based on a simplied version of their model,
but it makes endogenous the choice for a rm to be opaque or transparent.
Since the pioneer work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), a large literature has
studied the role played by asymmetric information in determining the credit
market equilibrium, considering adverse selection or moral hazard. Lenders
lack of information on the relevant characteristics of the borrowers may result
in underinvestment, and credit is said to be rationed. This seminal article
has been extended in various directions, e. g. Diamond (1984), Williamson
(1987), De Meza and Webb (1987), Gale, and Hellwig (1985). In all these
contributions, acquiring information may induce a cost for the lender but not
for the borrower.
As for signaling problems in credit market, Ja¤ee and Russell (1976) and
Leland and Pyle (1977) are the rst contributions that consider the incentive
for loans applicants to signal their quality either by choosing a particular
contract or by investing in their own projects. The possibility of screening
by the banks has been studied in various studies, see e.g. Milde and Riley
(1988) and Besanko and Thakor (1987).
Bencivenga and Smith (1991, 1993) and Azariadis and Smith (1998) have
investigated the macroeconomic consequences of imperfect capital markets.
They have developed overlapping generations models in which imperfection of
information may generate uctuations and low activity equilibria. A recent
4
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contribution in this vein is Alberto and Filippo (2013). With respect to
this literature, we propose a original mechanism that is able to generate
uctuations and indeterminacy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the signaling prob-
lem framework in the static model and optimal decisions of agents. Section 3
characterizes the static equilibrium. Section 4 incorporates the static frame-
work in an OLG model and presents various examples of dynamics that may
lead to endogenous uctuations and indeterminacy. Acknowledgments are
provided is section 5, and the most demanding proofs are presented in Sec-
tion 6.
2 The Model
2.1 Agents and gains
Consider a credit market populated by two kinds of agents: entrepreneurs and
investors. The entrepreneurs, also termed as "borrowers", are endowed with
one project that needs to raise capital. Investors, also termed as "lenders"
or "banks", are nancial intermediaries that collect savings and invest in
projects. All agents are risk-neutral. Each borrower needs to raise 1 unit of
fund to proceed a project, which yields a random return of v. The return of
the project varies across borrowers and is private information of the owner
of the project. Lenders only know the cross-sectional distribution H(v) of v:
The associated density function h(v) is positive and continuous for v 2 [v; v]
and zero elsewhere.
Borrowers, when facing a certain loan contract proposed by a lender,
have the option to choose either to publish information on their project or to
remain silent. Publishing information is costly; the cost is c > 0 and borne
solely by the borrower. It may correspond both to direct costs (auditing,
advertising), and indirect ones (no o¤shore activities). We call the borrowers
who reveal information transparent borrowers and those who do not reveal
information opaque ones. The fact that transparency has a cost for the
borrower is the main assumption of the model. The borrowers who choose
to be transparent reveal full information about the return of their projects
5
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and lenders know the realization of the return as well as the project owner.
Otherwise, lenders have no more information on the return other than the
distribution of v, H(v).
The market for loans is competitive and composed of two sub-markets:
one for transparent projects and one for opaque ones. Lenders o¤er loans
that must be repaid with interest at the end of the period. The repayments
required by the lenders are di¤erent for transparent and opaque borrowers:
R1 for opaque borrowers and R2 for transparent ones.
The contract between a borrower and a lender is a debt contract. Re-
payment Ri is fullled only when the realization of the return exceeds the
corresponding amount, i.e. v  R1 for an opaque project, and v  c  R2 for
transparent project. Otherwise lenders could only get what is realized, v or
v   c. Borrowers have no initial endowment to be pledged. Thus, the payo¤
of a transparent borrower for a project with a return v is
TB = maxfv  R2   c; 0g; (1)
if he could successfully get the loan; otherwise, TB = 0. The payo¤ of a
borrower that obtain a loan without revealing information is
OB = maxfv  R1; 0g: (2)
If v < R1; the borrower obtains a null gain if he undertakes or not the
project. It is assumed in this case that the borrower always undertakes the
project if he can get a loan. This assumption can be explained by the fact that
the entrepreneur also gets non market outcomes or private outcomes from
leading a project. As a consequence of this assumption, when an equilibrium
exists in which opaque projects get loans, all opaque projects are nanced.
Assuming that the funds are supplied by depositors at a safe interest
rate r0, and denoting R0 = 1 + r0, the prot of a bank o¤ering a loan to a
transparent borrower with a project of return v, is
TL = minfR2; v   cg  R0: (3)
The expected prot of a bank, if it provides a loan to an opaque borrower, is
OL = E[minfR1; vgj v is opaque] R0; (4)
6
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To summarize, we have the expected payo¤ of both borrowers and lenders
shown below in Figure 1. Figure 1 also provides the sequence of decisions:
borrowers rst choose to be opaque or transparent; secondly, lenders decide
if they invest or not in the projects.
2.2 Optimal decisions
Now we consider successively the optimal decisions of lenders and borrowers.
Lenders
For a lender, an investment in a transparent borrower is made if
minfR2; v   cg  R0  0 ) R2  R0 and v  R0 + c:
Let hO and hT be the density functions corresponding to opaque and
transparent projects. hO and hT are two non-negative functions dened on
[v; v]; with 8v 2 [v; v]; h(v) = hO(v) + hT (v): They are endogenous functions
that will be characterized at equilibrium.
The associated distribution functions are given by: HO(v) =
R v
v
hO(v)dv
and HT (v) =
R v
v
hT (v)dv: HO(v) is the fraction of opaque borrowers.
These notations allow expressing the expected prot of a lender investing
in an opaque borrower
OL =
R R1
v
vhO(v)dv +R1(HO(v) HO(R1))
HO(v)
 R0
If opaque borrowers are nanced at equilibrium, R1 must satisfy
ZO(R1) :=
R R1
v
vhO(v)dv +R1(HO(v) HO(R1))
HO(v)
 R0:
If for all values of R1; ZO(R1) < R0; this implies that there does not exist
any market for opaque project funding.
These results can be summarized by the following lemma:
Lemma 1 For given densities hO and hT characterizing the distribution of
opaque and transparent projects, for given repayment R1 and R0;
 If R2  R0; banks grant loans to the transparent projects with v  R0+c.
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 If R1 is such that ZO(R1)  R0; banks grant loans to all opaque projects.
Borrowers
Concerning borrowers, the decision to be transparent can be taken in two
cases: either the borrower can get the loan only if he reveals information; or
he can get the loan in any case, but the payo¤ of being transparent is higher.
Case 1: the borrower can get the loan only if he reveals information:8<:minfR2; v   cg  R0ZO(R1) < R0
The rst inequality means that the borrower can get the loan when being
transparent; the second one that he could not in remaining opaque. These
inequalities can be expressed as:8>>><>>>:
R0  R2
R0  v   c
ZO(R1) < R0
Case 2: the borrower can get the loan in any case, but the payo¤ of
being transparent is higher:8>>><>>>:
minfR2; v   cg  R0
ZO(R1)  R0
maxfv  R2   c; 0g  maxfv  R1; 0g
The rst inequality means that the borrower can get the loan when being
transparent; the second one that he can also get a loan in remaining opaque.
The third one expresses that the prot is higher when transparent. These
conditions can be simplied through:8>>><>>>:
R0  R2
R0  v   c
ZO(R1)  R0
8
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and
if v  R2 + c; R1  R2 + c
if v < R2 + c; R1  R0 + c
The cases in which borrowers choose to be transparent are now known.
There will also be two cases in which they will choose opacity: if revealing
information would imply no funding as v < R0 + c ; if remaining opaque
implies a higher prot, which is the case if v  R0 + c and ZO(R1)  R0;
with either v  R2 + c and R1 < R2 + c, or v < R2 + c and R1 < R0 + c.
Note that there exists a limit case, if v = R2 + c or if R1   c = R2; such
that the borrower is indi¤erent between revealing or not information.
Remark 1 The analysis seems intricate as it is necessary at this stage to
study all possible cases even if some of them will never happen at equilibrium.
For a competitive equilibrium, the condition R2 = R0 will be fullled that will
rule out the last subcase: it will be impossible to get both R0  v   c and
v < R2 + c.
Following this remark, it is only necessary to sum up the optimal borrow-
ersbehavior in the case R2 = R0: We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2 Assuming R2 = R0; the behavior of a borrower depends on the
value of his project v.
1. if v < R0 + c; he remains opaque.
2. if v  R0 + c; two cases may arise:
a if ZO(R1) < R0; he is transparent;
b if ZO(R1)  R0; he is opaque if R1 < R0 + c, transparent if R1 >
R0 + c: When R1 = R0 + c, he is indi¤erent between revealing
information or not.
9
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3 Market Equilibrium
3.1 Denition
This part denes the equilibrium for the credit market with free entry in the
banking sector: prots of nancial intermediaries cancel out at equilibrium.
The equilibrium is captured by a loan contract proposal (R1; R

2), with opti-
mal decisions of borrowers endowed with a project v about being transparent
or opaque, and optimal decisions of lenders to o¤er loans according to the
type of borrowers (transparent or opaque).
The equilibrium of the loan market is solved under the assumption that
borrowers always prefer to implement their project rather than doing nothing
when the prot in both cases is zero. As a consequence, when there is a
market for opaque projects, all projects are nanced. Under this assumption,
the equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Denition 3 An equilibrium of the credit market is characterized by density
functions for opaque and transparent projects hO and hT ; loan repayments
for opaque and transparent projects R1 and R

2 such that:
1. h = hO + hT
2. if Supp(hT ) 6= ;; then R2 = R0 and Supp(hT )  [R0 + c; v] : Moreover,
a either 8R1  R0; ZO(R1) < R0 ;
b or 9R1  R0 + c such that ZO(R1) = R0:
3. if Supp(hT ) = ;; then an equilibrium is characterized by a value R1 
R0 + c such that
R R1
v
vh(v)dv +R1(H(v) H(R1)) = R0:
The denition corresponds to the optimal decisions in the di¤erent possi-
ble cases for equilibrium repayments (R1; R

2). If Supp(hT ) 6= ;; there exists a
market for transparent projects with a loan repayment R2 = R0 (zero prot
condition). 2.a corresponds to Lemma 2(2.a), where there is no market for
opaque projects. A borrower can obtain a loan only if he is transparent. 2.b
is obtained in the case of Lemma 2(2.b), with R1  R0 + c, where a market
10
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for opaque projects exists with a loan repayment R1. But as R

1  R0+c; re-
vealing information increases the prot of the borrower. Finally, 3 is reached
when there does not exist a market for transparent projects (Lemma 2(2.b),
with R1  R0 + c). No borrower reveals information as R1  R0 + c:
3.2 Characterization
As we have discussed above, no borrower with a project v < R0 + c reveals
information under any circumstance, since to disclose the insu¢ cient quality
of the project would disable them from being nanced. We will refer to the
borrowers with v  R0 + c as good borrowers, and those with v < R0 + c as
bad ones. To avoid the triviality, we assume that:
Assumption 1: v > R0 + c:
This assumption means that at least some borrowers are good. Besides,
it also implies that the cost of information disclosure is relatively small com-
pared to the maximum value of the possible return on a risky project. By
this assumption, we also have H(R0 + c) < 1.
The following propositions allow to completely characterize the di¤erent
types of equilibria that may exist in this model.
Proposition 4 (Opaque Equilibrium ) Assume that the following inequal-
ity holds: Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0(1 H(R0 + c))  R0
Then, there exists a unique market equilibrium that is opaque: no borrower
is revealing information and all projects are nanced at a repayment loan
R1 < R0 + c dened as the solution ofZ R1
v
vh(v)dv +R1(1 H(R1)) = R0
Proposition 5 (Transparent Equilibrium ) Assume that:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c) (1 H(R0 + c)) < R0
11
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Then, there exists a unique market equilibrium that is transparent: all bor-
rowers with v  R0 + c reveal information and are nanced at a repayment
loan R0. The borrowers endowed with a project v < R0 + c choose to be
opaque and are not nanced.
Proposition 6 (Multiple Equilibria ) Assume that the two following in-
equalities hold: Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0(1 H(R0 + c)) < R0Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c) (1 H(R0 + c))  R0
Then there exist 3 types of equilibria:
1. a transparent equilibrium in which borrowers with v  R0 + c reveal
information and are nanced with a repayment loan R0, whereas bor-
rowers with v < R0 + c remain opaque and are not nanced.
2. an opaque equilibrium in which no borrower is revealing information
and all projects are nanced at a repayment loan R1  R0+ c such thatZ R1
v
vh(v)dv +R1(1 H(R1)) = R0
3. a multiplicity of (unstable) equilibria such that R1 = R0+c: All borrow-
ers with v < R0+c remain opaque. Borrowers with v  R0+c are split
in opaque and transparent projects. Transparent projects are nanced
at the repayment loan R0 and opaque borrowers at the repayment loan
R0 + c: hO is such thatZ R0+c
v
vh(v)
HO(v)
dv + (R0 + c)
(HO(v) HO(R0 + c))
HO(v)
= R0
Proof. see appendix.
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The three propositions are based on inequalities that rely on two func-
tions:
(R) 
Z R+c
v
vh(v)dv +R(1 H(R + c))
 (R) 
Z R+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R + c) (1 H(R + c))
It is easy to check that both functions are increasing and that (R) <
 (R). Proposition (4) corresponds to the case (R0)  R0 (and thus  (R0) >
R0). Proposition (5) is obtained when  (R0) < R0 (and thus (R0) < R0 ).
Finally, Proposition (6) corresponds to the intermediate case (R0) < R0 
 (R0):
The inequality  (R0)  R0 as a simple interpretation. It means that
the expected gain for a lender when the repayment loan is R0 + c is higher
than R0, when no borrower reveals information, Therefore, there may exist
a repayment loan R1  R0 + c that ensures the equilibrium of the opaque
market when all projects are opaque.
The inequality (R0) < R0 has also a simple interpretation when it is
written under the form: Z R0+c
v
vh(v)
H(R0 + c)
dv < R0
It means that the expected gain for a lender when the repayment loan is
R0+c is smaller than R0, for borrowers with v < R0+c (these that have never
interest to reveal information). Therefore, if all borrowers with v  R0 + c
choose to reveal information, there cannot exist a market for opaque projects.
In Proposition (4), it is optimal for all investors to remain opaque, as they
obtain a loan at a price R1 < R0 + c: The bad borrowers can be nanced
even if they are alone on the opaque market. The good borrowers have no
incentive to be transparent as they would have to pay a cost c that would be
higher than their gain R1 R0: In Proposition (5), it is not possible to have an
equilibrium on the opaque market at a price R1  R0+c: Therefore, all good
borrowers reveal information and are nanced at the cost R0: The bad ones
13
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o¤er an average gain that is too low to be nanced. Finally, in Proposition (6)
there is some interdependence between good and bad borrowers. If all good
borrowers remain opaque, all projects can be nanced at a cost R1  R0+ c:
If the good borrowers choose to reveal information, bad projects cannot be
nanced when they are alone on the opaque market. Between these two
equilibria, there exists a multiplicity of unstable equilibria with R1 = R0+ c:
All these equilibria have the same macroeconomic features. There exist an
innity of these equilibria as there is an innity of ways to split the good
borrowers between opaque and transparent ones leading to R1 = R0 + c:
They are unstable in the sense of the static "Walrasian tâtonnement": a
small variation in a price R1 or R

2 leads to a jump in either the transparent
or the opaque equilibrium.
3.3 Characterization with respect to the safe interest
factor R0
This part shows that the di¤erent types of equilibria can be characterized
with respect to the value of R0; if we introduce additional assumptions on
the distribution of the projects.
The following functions are now introduced:
F (R) 
Z R+c
v
vh(v)dv +R(1 H(R + c)) R
G(R) 
Z R+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R + c) (1 H(R + c)) R
Assumption 2:R v
v
vh(v)dv + c < v;
9!R^ > v   c such that F (R^) = 0:
Lemma 7 Under assumption 2, there exists a unique value R such that
G( R) = 0 and a unique value R^ such that F (R^) = 0. Moreover, R^ < R:
Proof. G is a decreasing function of R with G0(R) =  H(R+c); G(v c) =
c > 0 andG(v c) = R v
v
vh(v)dv v+c: Under Assumption 2, as G(v c) < 0;
there exists a unique value R such that G( R) = 0:
14
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F has the following properties: F 0(R) = ch(R + c)   H(R + c) with
F (v   c) = 0 and F 0(v   c) = ch(v) > 0; F (v   c) = R v
v
vh(v)dv   v + c < 0:
Therefore, the existence of R^ 2 (v   c; v   c) such that F (R^) = 0 is obtained.
But, as F is not monotone, the uniqueness of R^ is assumed. Moreover,
8R (v   c; v   c) ; F (R) < G(R); which implies R^ < R:
Proposition 8 Assume that the preceding assumptions hold. Then,
1. if R0 < R^; there exists a unique opaque equilibrium in which all projects
are nanced, and the total amount of loans is H(v) = 1;
2. if R0 > R; there exists a unique transparent equilibrium in which
projects such that v  R0 + c reveal information and are nanced;
the total amount of loans is 1 H(R0 + c);
3. if R^ < R0 < R; there exists two stable equilibria. One equilibrium
is opaque, all projects are nanced and the total amount of loans is
H(v) = 1: The second one is transparent. Projects such that v  R0+c
reveal information and are nanced, and the total amount of loans is
1 H(R0 + c).
Proof. The proof results from the properties of F and G: We have the
properties: R0  R^ , F (R0)  0 , (R0)  R0; R0  R , G(R0)  0 ,
 (R0)  R0: Then, the 3 cases respectively correspond to Propositions (4),
(5) and (6).
When the funding cost is low, banks tend to lower their lending standards
and invest in all projects. This leads to a high activity equilibrium. On
the other hand, when the funding cost is high, only the best projects are
nanced and they reveal full information. Finally, for intermediate values of
the interest rate, both type of equilibria may exist.
3.4 Credit Supply and Market Transparency
In this part, the risk free interest factor R0 is endogenized in a static macro-
economic model. Let us assume that the supply for loans, corresponding
to consumers savings, is given by an increasing function S(R0): The equi-
librium of the market for loans can lead to two types of equilibria: opaque
15
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or transparent. If the equilibrium is obtained in the interval

R^; R

; there
may exist multiple equilibria. The opaque equilibrium is associated with a
high activity level, when the transparent equilibrium corresponds to a low
aggregate income.
When the equilibrium is in the interval

R^; R

; the funding of bad
projects (those with v < R0+c) depends on the presence of good ones on the
opaque market for loans. If good projects choose to be transparent, bad ones
cannot be funded. A jump from the opaque to the transparent equilibrium
can be interpreted as a credit crunch that produces both a decrease in the
supply of credits and a decrease in the interest rate.
Figure 2 gives a simple illustration of these properties. The next part
will make endogenous the supply of loans in incorporating the model in a
dynamic framework.
4 Macroeconomic dynamics
4.1 An OLG model
In this section, an OLG model is developed that incorporates the nancial
markets described in the previous part. Each period, a continuum of agents
is born, with a unitary mass. Each agent is living during 3 periods: youth,
adulthood and old age, and she/he consumes in the two last ones. During
youth, the agent is endowed with a project of value v: During the old age,
she/he is retired.
A generation t agent is living in t   1; t and t + 1: The life cycle can be
summarized as follows.
In period t 1; she/he decides to be transparent or opaque, may borrow (if
possible) an amount of 1 from nancial intermediaries to nance his project,
at the risk free factor of interest Rt (determined in t  1).
In period t; she/he earns an income that is equal either to max(v R1t ; 0)
if the rm is opaque, or to max(v  c Rt; 0) if the rm is transparent, with
R1t the factor of interest for opaque projects. Moreover, each agent also earns
an exogenous amount w as labor income. We assume that w cannot be used
as collateral for the loan. The total income is spent for consumption and
16
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savings. Savings are invested through nancial intermediaries in the projects
of the next generation, with an interest factor Rt+1: Financial intermediaries
have no operating costs and are in perfect competition.
In period t+ 1; the agent consumes the proceed of savings.
The utility function of a generation t agent is given by a CES function:
(ct)
 1
 +  (dt+1)
 1

with ct the consumption level when adult, and dt+1 the consumption level
when old. Moreover, is is assumed that  > 1:
st is the amount that is saved between periods t and t+1 and transferred
to the nancial intermediaries. The budget constraints are:
ct + st = It(v)
dt+1 = Rt+1st
with It(v) the income, that can take the values w + max(v   R1t ; 0) or w +
max(v   c Rt; 0):
The optimal behavior gives savings as:
st =
It(v)
1 +  R1 t+1
and the amount of aggregate savings is determined by:
St =
Yt
1 +  R1 t+1
where Yt is the aggregate income earned by generation t during adulthood.
We now consider the equilibrium on the credit market in period t that de-
termines Rt+1: The total supply of loans is given by the amount of aggregate
savings St: Therefore, it depends on the type of equilibrium that occurs in
t; opaque or transparent. Moreover, the total amount of loans also depends
on the equilibrium that will occur on the market in t + 1: Therefore, four
regimes may arise for the equilibrium.
17
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Considering the supply of loans in t: Yt can take two values, depending on
the type of equilibrium that occurs in t: For an opaque equilibrium, aggregate
income is:
Y Ot = w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv  Rt
as all projects have been nanced. The average/aggregate cost of loans is
Rt : the good projects (v  R1t ) reimburse R1t > Rt when the bad ones
(v < R1t ) reimburse v; the average payment being Rt. This equilibrium
exists if Rt < R:
For a transparent equilibrium, aggregate income is:
Y Tt = w +
vZ
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c) [1 H (Rt + c)]
as only projects such that v  Rt+ c have been nanced. Each project bears
to costs: Rt to the lender and c to be transparent. This equilibrium exists if
Rt > R^: It is possible to compare Y Ot and Y
T
t :
Y Ot   Y Tt =
Rt+cZ
v
vh(v)dv + (Rt + c) [1 H (Rt + c)] Rt
Then, for Rt = R; Y Ot = Y
T
t ; and Y
O
t > Y
T
t , Rt < R: When Rt > R; the
aggregate income for generation t in period t is higher when only the good
projects are nanced.
The total amount of loans on the credit market also depends on the
equilibrium that will occur in t+1: If the equilibrium in t+1 is opaque, the
total amount of loans is equal to 1: If the equilibrium in t+1 is transparent,
the total total amount of loans is equal to 1 H (Rt+1 + c) :
As a consequence, the dynamics of Rt is determined by four conditions
corresponding to the four regimes:
Opaque equilibrium in t and t+ 1 :
1 +  R1 t+1 = w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv  Rt
Rt < R and Rt+1 < R
18
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Opaque equilibrium in t; transparent equilibrium in t+ 1 :
[1 H (Rt+1 + c)]
 
1 +  R1 t+1

= w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv  Rt
Rt < R and Rt+1 > R^
Transparent equilibrium in t; opaque equilibrium in t+ 1 :
 
1 +  R1 t+1

= w +
vZ
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c) [1 H (Rt + c)]
Rt > R^ and Rt+1 < R
Transparent equilibrium in t; transparent equilibrium in t+ 1 :
[1 H (Rt+1 + c)]
 
1 +  R1 t+1

= w +
vZ
Rt+c
vh(v)dv   (Rt + c) [1 H (Rt + c)]
Rt > R^ and Rt+1 > R^
For the dynamics, Rt is a predetermined variable in t; as it results from the
equilibrium on the savings market in t  1:
It is possible to summarize the dynamics under a simple form, introducing
the following functions:
FO(R) = w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv  R
F T (R) = w +
vZ
R+c
vh(v)dv   (R + c) [1 H (R + c)]
GO(R) =
 
1 +  R1 

GT (R) = [1 H (R + c)]  1 +  R1 
All these functions are decreasing. Moreover, FO(R) > F T (R) , R < R
and G0(R) > GT (R):
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The dynamics can be summarized by a sequence (Rt; St); where St 2
fO; Tg is the state of the economy in period t such that:
F St(Rt) = G
St+1(Rt+1)
and if Rt < R^; St = O; if Rt > R; St = T; if R^  Rt  R; St = O or T:
4.2 Existence of stationary states
In the opaque regime, a stationary state is a value of R < R such that
1 +  R1  = w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv  R
or
R +  R1  = w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv   1
The left-hand side is a U-shape function that tends to be innite in 0 and
+1; with a minimum in R = (   1)1==: A necessary condition for the
existence of a stationary state is that the minimum is below the right-hand
side value:
(   1) 1 

< w +
vZ
v
vh(v)dv   1;
and in this case, two steady states may exist. This condition shows that a
high value of w and  are favorable.
In the transparent regime, a stationary state is a value of R > R^ such
that
[1 H (R + c)]  1 +  R1  = w + vZ
R+c
vh(v)dv   (R + c) [1 H (R + c)]
It is straightforward to see that, for w = 0; R = v   c is a steady state
that is stable. The existence of such a steady state results from the adverse
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selection mechanism. When only a few numbers of projects are nanced,
this implies a low aggregate income for the next period, that induces a low
supply of credit and a tighter selection of projects. This process converges
to a steady state in which only the best project is nanced and aggregate
income tends to zero.
Incorporating an exogenous additional income w allows to obtain a trans-
parent steady state associated with a positive aggregate income. For w low
enough, this steady state always exists in a neighborhood of R = v   c:
4.3 Simulations with a uniform distribution
h is assumed to be a uniform distribution on [;  + ] ; with a density 1=:
In this case,
FO(R) = w +  +

2
 R
F T (R) = w +
( +   R  c)2
2
GO(R) =
 
1 +  R1 

GT (R) =
( +   R  c)

 
1 +  R1 

Depending on the parameters values, di¤erent types of dynamics can be
obtained. We consider parameters values that allows to illustrate the di¤erent
possible dynamics, emphasizing the possible occurrence of non monotonic
paths, changes in regime and credit crunches. More precisely, the di¤erent
examples are obtained in changing the value of w: Other parameters values
are chosen in such a way that: for w low enough, there only exists one
stationary equilibrium that is transparent, obtained in a neighborhood of
R = v   c; for w high enough, there only exists one stationary (stable)
equilibrium, which is opaque.
The following values are taken for the di¤erent parameters: c = 0:3,
 = 1,  = 4,  = 0:5,  = 1:5. Then, increasing w from 0 allows to obtain
various dynamics.
Starting from w = 0; Figure 3 presents the dynamics that is monotonic
and converges to R = v c: An increase of w lets unchanged the two functions
GO(R) and GT (R); but induces an upward move for the two functions FO(R)
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and F T (R): Increasing w to 0:5 (Figure 4) also gives a monotonic dynamics
converging to a non trivial steady state. In these two cases, the dynamics
is assumed to start from an initial opaque equilibrium. But there is a quick
transition to a transparent one.
When w takes the value 1:2 (Figure 5), the transparent steady state
equilibrium now belongs to the interval

R^; R

: The transition between an
opaque and a transparent state induces a non monotonic dynamics that con-
verges to a transparent steady state.
For w = 1:7 (Figure 6), there does not exist a steady state equilibrium. A
possible long run equilibrium is a cycle in which the economy experiences at
each period a transition between an opaque and a transparent equilibrium.
In the case w = 1:9 (Figure 7), there exists a steady state opaque equi-
librium. Starting from a transparent equilibrium, the gure shows that the
dynamics must pass through oscillations between transparent and opaque
regimes, before converging to the steady state. The dynamics is oscillating
in a rst phase, and then monotonic.
Figure 7 presents also a case of indeterminacy of the equilibrium. A
necessary condition for the occurrence of indeterminacy is that GT (R^) >
GO( R): In this case, it is possible that, for Rt 2

R^; R

; two values of Rt+1
may be possible depending on the expected regime, opaque or transparent.
In Figure 7, there is only one possible long run state which is the opaque
steady state. But it is possible to reach it by di¤erent ways. On the gure,
arrows in orange provide another dynamic path.
To illustrate widely the possibility of indeterminacy, a last gure is pre-
sented corresponding to the parameters values c = 0:1,  = 1,  = 4,  = 0:5,
 = 1:6 and w = 1:5. Figure 8 is enlarged in order to focus on the part
R^; R

: Parameters are such that a transparent steady state exists in the
interval

R^; R

. Two possible paths are represented among many others.
First, it is possible to have a monotone convergence in the transparent regime
to the steady state (blue arrows). But from the steady state it is possible to
jump in the opaque regime during one period and then to come back to the
transparent regime. It is also possible to imagine more complex paths with
alternation of periods in both regimes.
Through these di¤erent cases, we observe how a change of regime may be
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a source of uctuations in interest rate and in GDP. It is also possible to have
indeterminacy of the equilibrium that may result in sunspot uctuations.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4, 5 and 6. We rst show that any equilibrium
must be of one of the three types presented in propositions 4, 5 and 6.
Starting from Denition 3, if an equilibrium satises conditions 2.a, there
is no market for opaque projects. Then, only the good projects v 2 [R0+c; v]
reveal information and are nanced at the cost R0: The density hO of opaque
projects corresponds to the density h reduced to the interval [v
¯
; R0+c[: There
is no market for these projects if the maximal expected gain for a lender is
smaller than R0; or: Z R0+c
v
vh(v)
H(R0 + c)
dv < R0
If an equilibrium satises conditions 2.b, we can have either R1 > R0 + c
or R1 = R0 + c: The case R

1 > R0 + c is impossible as it implies that
all the good projects v 2 [R0 + c; v] reveal information. Therefore, all the
opaque projects such that [v
¯
; R0 + c[ makes default and the expected gain
for a lender does not rise in increasing R1 at a higher value than R0 + c:
The only possible equilibrium is then for R1 = R0+ c: In this case, the good
projects v 2 [R0 + c; v] are indi¤erent between revealing information or not.
They must be shared between opaque and transparent ones in such a way
that the expected gain for opaque projects is exactly R0 when R1 = R0 + c:
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This property leads to:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)
HO(v)
dv + (R0 + c)
(HO(v) HO(R0 + c))
HO(v)
= R0
There is an innite way to satisfy this equality in splitting the good projects
between opaque and transparent ones. This equality can be obtained if two
conditions are fullled: the opaque projects v 2 [v
¯
; R0+ c[ must give an aver-
age return smaller than R0; if all projects are opaque (hO = h), the average
return is not lower than R0: These two conditions give the inequalities:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)
H(R0 + c)
dv < R0Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c))  R0
Finally, the equilibrium satises condition 3 if the expected return is not
lower than R0 when all projects are opaque and R1 = R0 + c; or:Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1 H(R0 + c))  R0
Indeed, under this condition there exists a value R1  R0 + c such that:Z R1
v
vh(v)dv +R1(1 H(R1)) = R0
For this value, no good project have an interest to reveal information.
Considering the conditions for the existence of the di¤erent types of equi-
libria, it is possible to conclude. If the condition
R R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + R0(1  
H(R0 + c))  R0 holds, as this condition implies
R R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 +
c)(1   H(R0 + c)) > R0; the only possible equilibrium is the last one, in
which all projects are opaque and are nanced at a cost R1 < R0+ c (propo-
sition 4). If
R R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1   H(R0 + c)) < R0 holds, as this
condition implies
R R0+c
v
vh(v)dv+R0(1 H(R0+ c)) < R0; the only possible
equilibrium is the rst one, in which only the good projects are nanced at
the cost R0 (proposition 5).
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Finally, if the two following conditions are satised,Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv +R0(1 H(R0 + c)) < R0Z R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c) (1 H(R0 + c))  R0
three types of equilibria may occur: the opaque equilibrium (similar to
the one of proposition 4 as
R R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + (R0 + c)(1   H(R0 + c)) 
R0), the transparent equilibrium (similar to the one of of proposition 5 asR R0+c
v
vh(v)dv + R0(1   H(R0 + c)) < R0), and the multiple equilibria of
proposition 6 with R1 = R0 + c:
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piL = min{R2, v − c} − R0 
piB = max{v − c − R2, 0} 
piL = E[min{R1, v}|v is opaque] − R0 
piB = max{v − R1, 0}
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Figure 1: Decisions and related payoffs 
Let α be the fraction of opaque borrowers and hO(v) be the fraction of the density
function for borrowers who are opaque, and we have
∫ v¯
v
hO(v) = α. Denote HO(v) =∫ v
v
hO(v). Thus, equation(4) can be written as
piOL =
∫ R1
v
vhO(v)dv +R1(α−HO(R1))
α
−R0 (6)
So if the borrowers choose not to reveal the information, lenders will choose to offer the
loan if and only if
ZO(R1) :=
∫ R1
v
vhO(v)dv +R1(α−HO(R1))
α
≥ R0. (7)
Note that ZO is non-decreasing in R1, and Z
′
1 < 1 for any R1 ∈ (v, v¯), with minZO(R1) =
ZO(v) = v and maxZO(R1) = ZO(v¯) = E[V |V is opaque].
Then, we consider the borrower’s decision of whether or not to release information
about the return of his project. There are 2 cases under which borrowers have the incentive
to reveal information.
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